Howard Sankey

Induction and Natural Kinds Revisited

Howard Sankey

Book Chapter  |  2021

Howard Sankey reconsiders a special issue closely connected with causal powers—the problem of induction. He addresses a deep versi..

Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science

Howard Sankey

Journal article  |  2021  |  Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy

The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontologi..

The Relativistic Legacy of Kuhn and Feyerabend

Howard Sankey

Book Chapter  |  2020

Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–1996) and Paul K. Feyerabend (1924–1994) were central figures in the historical turn that took place in the p..

Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism

Howard Sankey

Journal article  |  2020  |  Organon F

The aim of this paper is to document Laudan’s rejection of the appeal to intuition in the context of his development of normative ..

Scientific Realism and the Conflict with Common Sense

Howard Sankey

Book Chapter  |  2020

The aim of this paper is to identify and resolve a tension between scientific realism and commonsense realism that arises due to a..

Epistemic Objectivity and the Virtues

Howard Sankey

Journal article  |  2020  |  Filozofia Nauki

The aim of this paper is to bring the resources of virtue epistemology to bear on the issue of the epistemic objectivity of scienc..

Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi

Howard Sankey

Journal article  |  2019  |  Logos & Episteme

This note is a comment on a recent paper in this journal by Moti Mizrahi. Mizrahi claims that the factivity of knowledge entails t..

Rescuing Renouvier

Howard Sankey

Journal article  |  2019  |  Metascience

Charles Renouvier (1815–1903) was a French philosopher active throughout much of the nineteenth century. Not formally trained as a..

Reality and the ashtray

Howard Sankey

Journal article  |  2019  |  Metascience

Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski

Howard Sankey

Journal article  |  2019  |  Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology

This is a reply to Alex Grzankowski’s comment on my paper, ‘To Believe is to Believe True’. I argue that one may believe a proposi..