Steven Williams

Trade of a common value good

SR Williams

Journal article  |  2022  |  Review of Economic Design

When traders have private information about a common value good, adverse selection alone is insufficient to prevent trade of the g..

Price discovery using a double auction

Mark A Satterthwaite, Steven R Williams, Konstantinos E Zachariadis

Journal article  |  2021  |  GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR

We investigate equilibrium in the buyer's bid double auction (BBDA) in a model with correlated private values/costs. Using a combi..

On bidding with securities: Risk aversion and positive dependence

Vineet Abhishek, Bruce Hajek, Steven R Williams

Journal article  |  2015  |  GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR

DeMarzo et al. (2005) consider auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose values are..

Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions

Mark A Satterthwaite, Steven R Williams, Konstantinos E Zachariadis

Journal article  |  2014  |  GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR

We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers. Traders privately know their values/costs, which are stati..

Auctions with a profit sharing contract

Vineet Abhishek, Bruce Hajek, Steven R Williams

Journal article  |  2013  |  GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR

An auction is used to sell a resource that is then developed by the winning buyer to generate a profit. Two forms of payment are c..

Communication in mechanism design: A differential approach

SR Williams

Book  |  2008

Mechanism design is the field of economics that treats institutions and procedures as variables that can be selected in order to a..

Limited observability as a constraint in contract design

Stefan Krasa, Steven R Williams

Journal article  |  2007  |  JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

Limited observability is the assumption that economic agents can only observe a finite amount of information. Given this constrain..

The optimality of a simple market mechanism

MA Satterthwaite, SR Williams

Journal article  |  2002  |  ECONOMETRICA

Strategic behavior in a finite market can cause inefficiency in the allocation, and market mechanisms differ in how successfully t..

Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply

E Zacharias, SR Williams

Journal article  |  2001  |  JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

We examine the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction for sequences of markets in which the number m ..

Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

SR Williams

Journal article  |  2001  |  Review of Economic Design

Given an objective for a group of three or more agents that satisfies monotonicity and no veto power, Maskin (1977) proposes a two..