PROVABLE ELIMINATION OF INFORMATION LEAKAGE THROUGH TIMING CHANNELS

Abstract

This project aims to develop techniques to solve the issue in information security of unauthorised information flow resulting from competition for shared hardware resources. The project will combine operating systems design, formal hardware models, information-flow reasoning and theorem proving to achieve a goal that is widely considered infeasible. The project is expected to result in a system that prevents leakage of critical information, such as encryption keys, through timing channels. This should prevent sophisticated attacks on public clouds, mobile devices and military-grade cross-domain devices.

Related publications (2)

Towards Provable Timing-Channel Prevention

G Heiser, T Murray, G Klein

2020-07-01

We describe our ongoing research that aims to eliminate microarchitectural timing channels through time protection, which eliminat..

Can We Prove Time Protection?

G Heiser, G Klein, T Murray

2019-05-12

© 2019 ACM. Timing channels are a significant and growing security threat in computer systems, with no established solution. We ha..