INCOMPLETE INFORMATION MODELS FOR INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION

Grant number: DP200103574 | Funding period: 2020 - 2023

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Abstract

Mergers, acquisitions, and collusive conduct take place in imperfectly competitive environments where firms have incomplete information about others. Despite this, standard workhorse models for analyzing the associated competitive effects assume that firms have complete information and typically only accommodate imperfect competition on one side of the market. This project aims to remedy this deficiency by developing the economic theory and associated practical tools for the analysis of competitive effects in settings with incomplete information and market power on both sides. The project work will be presented at seminars and workshops around the globe to both academic audiences and to prac..

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Related publications (12)

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Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms

S Loertscher, LM Marx

2023-01-01

We develop a prior-free mechanism for an asset market that is dominant-strategy incentive compatible, ex post individually rationa..

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When Walras meets Vickrey

David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher, Claudio Mezzetti

2022-11-01

We consider general asset market environments in which agents with quasilinear payoffs are endowed with objects and have demands f..

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Double Markups, Information, and Vertical Mergers

S Loertscher, LM Marx

2022-09-01

In vertical contracting models with complete information and linear prices, double markups that arise between independent firms pr..

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To sell public or private goods

Simon Loertscher, Leslie M Marx

2022-08-04

Traditional analysis takes the public or private nature of goods as given. However, technological advances, particularly related t..

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Bilateral Trade with Multiunit Demand and Supply

Simon Loertscher, Leslie M Marx

2022-05-02

We study a bilateral trade problem with multiunit demand and supply and one-dimensional private information. Each agent geometrica..

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Monopoly Pricing, Optimal Randomization, and Resale

Simon Loertscher, Ellen V Muir

2022-03-01

We provide a parsimonious and unified explanation for randomized selling mechanisms widely used in practice yet commonly perceived..

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Optimal market thickness

Simon Loertscher, Ellen Muir, Peter G Taylor

2021-11-18

Traders that arrive over time give rise to a dynamic tradeoff between the benefits of increasing gains from trade by accumulating ..

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Coordinated Effects in Merger Review

Simon Loertscher, Leslie M Marx

2021-11-01

Coordinated effects are merger-related harms that arise because a subset of postmerger firms modify their conduct to limit competi..

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A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement

Simon Loertscher, Claudio Mezzetti

2021-07-01

The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality..

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Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration

Simon Loertscher, Leslie M Marx

2021-02-01

We provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets wi..

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Digital monopolies: Privacy protection or price regulation?

S Loertscher, LM Marx

2020-07-01

Increasing returns to scale in data gathering and processing give rise to a new form of monopoly, referred to here as digital mono..

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Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions

Simon Loertscher, Leslie M Marx

2020-05-01

Clock auctions have a number of properties that make them attractive for practical purposes. They are weakly group strategy-proof,..

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