Reputation-Seeking by a Government Agency in Europe: Direct Evidence from Responses to the 2009 H1N1 "Swine" Influenza Pandemic
ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY | SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC | Published : 2017
Reputation-seeking can explain some decisions of U.S. federal agencies. However, it has remained unclear whether it could be used in the European context where agencies have proliferated in national and regional governance in the past few decades. This article shows that reputation-seeking can occur at autonomous agencies in the European context. A unique participant-observational study of an international public health agency acting in response to the 2009 H1N1 “swine” influenza pandemic provides bases for this conclusion. It adds empirical support for the proposition using real-time observations of and in-depth interviews on the agency’s decision-making processes.
Awarded by National Science Foundation
Awarded by Danish Council for Independent Research
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This study was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES-0826995 and Danish Council for Independent Research Grant 12-131952.