Journal article

Faithful Implementations of Distributed Algorithms and Control Laws

Takashi Tanaka, Farhad Farokhi, Cedric Langbort

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL OF NETWORK SYSTEMS | IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC | Published : 2017

Abstract

When a distributed algorithm must be executed by strategic agents with misaligned interests, a social leader needs to introduce an appropriate tax/subsidy mechanism to incentivize agents to faithfully implement the intended algorithm so that a correct outcome is obtained. We discuss the incentive issues of implementing economically efficient distributed algorithms using the framework of indirect mechanism design theory. In particular, we show that indirect Groves mechanisms are not only sufficient but also necessary to achieve incentive compatibility. This result can be viewed as a generalization of the Green-Laffont theorem to indirect mechanisms. Then we introduce the notion of asymptotic ..

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