Information and the persistence of private-order contract enforcement institutions: An experimental analysis

Tom Wilkening

Journal article

Information and the persistence of private-order contract enforcement institutions: An experimental analysis

Tom Wilkening

European Economic Review | ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV | Published : 2016

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.07.004

University of Melbourne Researchers

Tom Wilkening Author Economics

Related Projects (1)

Extending Economic Design To Non-Market Settings: An Experimental Study Of Mechanism Design With Intention-Based Preferences

Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic system..

Grants

Awarded by ARC Discovery Early Career Research Award

Funding Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Abhijit Banerjee, Ernst Fehr, and Sergei Izmalkov, for their thoughtful and detailed comments on earlier drafts. I am also indebted to Georg Hartmann and Holger Herz for their help with translation and managing the laboratory in Zurich. I also thank Daron Acemoglu, Jim Berry, David Cooper, Nisvan Erkal, Greg Fischer, Simon Loertscher, Nikos Nikiforakis, Chris Smith, Rob Townsend, Patrick Warren, and four anonymous referees for valuable comments on the paper. All programs were written in Z-Tree (www.iew.unizh.ch/ztree/). I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the George and Obie Schultz Fund Research Grant, The University of Melbourne Faculty of Business and Economics, and the ARC Discovery Early Career Research Award DE140101014.