Journal article

First Degree Entailment, Symmetry and Paradox

G Restall

Logic and Logical Philosophy | Nicolaus Copernicus | Published : 2017


Here is a puzzle, which I learned from Terence Parsons in his “True Contradictions” [8]. First Degree Entailment (fde) is a logic which allows for truth value gaps as well as truth value gluts. If you are agnostic between assigning paradoxical sentences gaps and gluts (and there seems to be no very good reason to prefer gaps over gluts or gluts over gaps if you’re happy with fde), then this looks no different, in effect, from assigning them a gap value? After all, on both views you end up with a theory that doesn’t commit you to the paradoxical sentence or its negation. How is the fde theory any different from the theory with gaps alone? In this paper, I will present a clear answer to this p..

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Awarded by Australian Research Council

Funding Acknowledgements

Thanks to Jc Beall, Rohan French and Shawn Standefer and an anonymous referee for discussions and feedback on the topics here. This research is supported by the Australian Research Council, through Grant dp150103801.