Journal article
A New Service Mechanism for Profit Optimizations of a Cloud Provider and Its Users
C Liu, K Li, K Li, R Buyya
IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing | IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC | Published : 2021
Abstract
In this paper, we try to design a service mechanism for profit optimizations of both a cloud provider and its multiple users. We consider the problem from a game theoretic perspective and characterize the relationship between the cloud provider and its multiple users as a Stackelberg game, in which the strategies of all users are subject to that of the cloud provider. The cloud provider tries to select and provision appropriate servers and configure a proper request allocation strategy to reduce energy cost while satisfying its cloud users at the same time. We approximate its servers selection space by adding a controlling parameter and configure an optimal request allocation strategy. For e..
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Awarded by National Key Research and Development Program of China
Funding Acknowledgements
We are very grateful to the associate editor and anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions which have significantly improved the quality of the manuscript. The research was partially funded by the Key Programof National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61432005), the National Outstanding Youth Science Programof National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61625202), the International (Regional) Cooperation and Exchange Programof NationalNatural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61661146006), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (GrantNos. 61370095, 61472124, 61602170), the International Science & Technology Cooperation Program of China (Grant Nos. 2015DFA11240), the National Key R&D Program of China (Grant No. 2016YFB0201402), and the Chinese Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Grant Nos. 2016M602409, 2016M602410).