Journal article

Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in n-person games.

Shinsuke Suzuki, Eizo Akiyama

J Theor Biol | Published : 2008

Abstract

Evolution of cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals has been of considerable concern in various fields such as biology, economics, and psychology. The evolution of cooperation is often explained by reciprocity. Under reciprocity, cooperation can prevail in a society because a donor of cooperation receives reciprocation from the recipient of the cooperation, called direct reciprocity, or from someone else in the community, called indirect reciprocity. Nowak and Sigmund [1993. Chaos and the evolution of cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 90, 5091-5094] have demonstrated that directly reciprocal cooperation in two-person prisoner's dilemma games with mutation of strategies can..

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University of Melbourne Researchers