Conference Proceedings
Evolutionary chasing between cooperators and defectors on the spatial prisoner’s dilemma
Shinsuke Suzuki, Genki Ichinose, Masaya Saito, Christoph Adami (ed.), David M Bryson (ed.), Charles Ofria (ed.), Robert Pennock (ed.)
The MIT Press | Published : 2012
Abstract
The role of migration in the evolution of cooperation has been discussed in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games (PD). It is known that small but non-zero migration rates facilitate the formation and maintenance of cooperation. Several studies have dealt with the effect of migration on the evolution of cooperation (Enquist and Leimar, 1993; Sicardi et al., 2009; Vainstein et al., 2006; Janssen and Goldstone, 2006; Killingback et al., 2006; Ichinose and Arita, 2007, 2008; Pepper and Smuts, 2002; Pepper, 2007). Recently, Suzuki and Kimura (2011) found that oscillatory cooperation and defection dynamics take place if the migration rate is allowed to evolve. However, little is known about underlying..
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