Conference Proceedings

Verified verifiers for verifying elections

T Haines, R Goré, M Tiwari

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security | ACM | Published : 2019

Abstract

The security and trustworthiness of elections is critical to democracy; alas, securing elections is notoriously hard. Powerful cryptographic techniques for verifying the integrity of electronic voting have been developed and are in increasingly common use. The claimed security guarantees of most of these techniques have been formally proved. However, implementing the cryptographic verifiers which utilise these techniques is a technical and error prone process, and often leads to critical errors appearing in the gap between the implementation and the formally verified design. We significantly reduce the gap between theory and practice by using machine checked proofs coupled with code extracti..

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Grants

Funding Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Thomas Haines acknowledges the support of the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) and the Research Council of Norway for the joint project SURCVS.