Pseudorandom Black Swans: Cache Attacks on CTR_DRBG
Shaanan Cohney, Andrew Kwong, Shahar Paz, Daniel Genkin, Nadia Heninger, Eyal Ronen, Yuval Yarom
2020 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY (SP 2020) | IEEE COMPUTER SOC | Published : 2020
Modern cryptography requires the ability to securely generate pseudorandom numbers. However, despite decades of work on side-channel attacks, there is little discussion of their application to pseudorandom number generators (PRGs). In this work we set out to address this gap, empirically evaluating the side-channel resistance of common PRG implementations.We find that hard-learned lessons about side-channel leakage from encryption primitives have not been applied to PRGs, at all abstraction levels. At the design level, the NIST-recommended CTR_DRBG does not have forward security if an attacker is able to compromise the state (e.g., via a side-channel). At the primitive level, popular impleme..View full abstract
Awarded by National Science Foundation
Awarded by ISF
Awarded by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under grant no. CNS-1651344, by the ISF under grant number 1523/14, by gifts from Intel and AMD corporations, and by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under contract FA8750-19-C-0531. Eyal Ronen is a member of CPIIS.