Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
Bettina Klaus, Alexandru Nichifor
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | SPRINGER | Published : 2021
We adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism φ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and o..View full abstract
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