Journal article

Strategic customer behavior in an M/M/1 feedback queue

Mark Fackrell, Peter Taylor, Jiesen Wang

QUEUEING SYSTEMS | SPRINGER | Published : 2021

Abstract

We investigate the behavior of equilibria in an M/M/1 feedback queue where price- and time-sensitive customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. Upon arrival, customers can observe the number of customers in the system and then decide to join or to balk. Customers are served in order of arrival. After being served, each customer either successfully completes the service and departs the system with probability q, or the service fails and the customer immediately joins the end of the queue to wait to be served again until she successfully completes it. We analyze this decision problem as a noncooperative game among the customers. We show that ..

View full abstract

Grants

Awarded by Australian Research Council (ARC) Laureate Fellowship


Funding Acknowledgements

P. G. Taylor's research is supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC) Laureate Fellowship FL130100039 and the ARC Centre of Excellence for the Mathematical and Statistical Frontiers (ACEMS). M. Fackrell's research is supported by the ARC Centre of Excellence for the Mathematical and Statistical Frontiers (ACEMS). J. Wang would like to thank the University of Melbourne for supporting her work through the Melbourne Research Scholarship.