Journal article
Digging Into Deterrence: An Examination of Deterrence-Based Theories and Evidence in Employment Standards Enforcement
Tess Hardy
The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations | Kluwer Law International | Published : 2021
DOI: 10.54648/ijcl2021007
Abstract
In a bid to curb employer non-compliance with wage and hour regulation, policy-makers across many different jurisdictions are seeking to deliver greater doses of deterrence. This trend stems from a series of common assumptions. In particular, it is often assumed that introducing stiffer sanctions, such as criminal penalties for wage theft, will automatically amplify the relevant deterrence effects. This article seeks to unpack these assumptions to better understand: a) how deterrence is conceptualized and understood in the context of wage underpayment; and b) which tools or approaches are likely to be most powerful in enhancing deterrence and promoting compliance. Drawing on recent developme..
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Awarded by Australian Research Council
Funding Acknowledgements
Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, Australia. This research was supported by funding from the Australian Research Council (Discovery Early Career Research Fellow: DE180100279, `Work in Franchises: Searching for Solutions at the Regulatory Frontier'). The author is grateful for the thoughtful feedback from presenters and participants at the Compliance with and Enforcement of Labour Laws: An International Workshop (Hebrew University of Jerusalem). This article also benefited from the helpful comments of Professor Christine Parker, Professor Guy Davidov and the anonymous reviewer. Thanks also to the excellent research assistance of Louise De Plater. Email: tess.hardy@unimelb.edu.au.