Journal article
An empirical study of interest-based negotiation
Philippe Pasquier, Ramon Hollands, Iyad Rahwan, Frank Dignum, Liz Sonenberg
AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS | SPRINGER | Published : 2011
Abstract
While argumentation-based negotiation has been accepted as a promising alternative to game-theoretic or heuristic-based negotiation, no evidence has been provided to confirm this theoretical advantage. We propose a model of bilateral negotiation extending a simple monotonic concession protocol by allowing the agents to exchange information about their underlying interests and possible alternatives to achieve them during the negotiation. We present an empirical study that demonstrates (through simulation) the advantages of this interest-based negotiation approach over the more classic monotonic concession approach to negotiation. © 2010 The Author(s).
Grants
Funding Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and the Center for High Performance Computing of The University of Melbourne for their services and support. This research was made possible by the Australian Research Council and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.